A client wishes to outsource computation on confidential data to a network of servers. He does not trust a server on its own, but believes that servers do not collude. To solve this problem we introduce a new scheme for perfect security in the context of secure multiparty computation in the semi-honest model that naturally requires at least three parties. It differs from classical work such as Yao, GMW, BGW or GRR through an explicit distinction of keys and encrypted values rather than thinking in terms of shares of a secret. Furthermore, it makes use of the distributive and associative nature of our encryption scheme and, at times, "double" encrypts values. Any Boolean circuit C in disjunctive normal form with w variables per clause can be evaluated in O(log k) rounds using messages of size O(2 w−k ) for an arbitrary parameter k ∈ [2, w] and O(|C| · 2 w−k ) bit operations. We allow for collusion of up to n−2 parties. On the theoretical side our scheme improves a large body of work in one or several metrics. On the practical side, our local computation requirements improve on the run-time of GRR using Shamir's secret sharing up to several orders of magnitude.
Introduction
Cloud computing has boosted the need for methods to compute on encrypted data. Ideally, a client encrypts data and sends the encrypted data to an (untrusted) cloud provider, while retaining the keys. A lot of hope has been put into fully homomorphic encryption(FHE) with a number of recent breakthrough results. Still, FHE is considered far too slow for most practical applications. Secure multi-party computation is a computationally much more efficient approach. A client can outsource computation to a group of servers, relying on the assumption that servers do not collude (to retrieve confidential information). In the semi-honest model with a curious but passive attacker a server is assumed to monitor and store all data, but otherwise it sticks to the proposed protocol. In contrast to prior work, which often relies on two parties, we require at least three parties, where each party can be thought of having a dedicated role: a keyholder (KH), an encrypted value holder (EVH) and a helper. The keyholder has access to the keys but not to any encrypted data. The encrypted value holder can access encrypted values but no keys. A helper can access keys and encrypted values that do not match, ie. none of its keys can be used to decrypt any of its encrypted values. Note, there are circumstances, where this distinction has to be seen less strict, eg. for secret a there might be two encryptions such that one encrypted value is held by the KH. We also discuss two different encryption schemes (plus a small variation of one scheme). All are associative and distributive. This results in similar protocols, however, with a different range of supported operations. Whereas our one-time pad XOR encryption is efficient for Boolean operations, additive encryption (in a ring) is best suited for arithmetic operations such as integer multiplication and addition. Whereas for XOR and addition only the KH and EVH are needed, for multiplication and AND of two numbers, additionally, at least one helper party is needed. One motivation to use two helpers, yielding a total of four parties, is that the AND of two numbers can be computed by combining four parts consisting only of encrypted values and keys. Each part is computed by one party, reencrypted and combined by the KH and EVH to yield an encrypted AND of the two numbers. Through double encryption of values, we can reduce the number of parties to three.
The above ideas led to the following contributions:
• We present a new scheme for secure multiparty computation in the semi-honest model for Boolean circuits as well as for arithmetic expression using n ≥ 3 parties, allowing for collusion of up to n − 2 parties. As discussed in detail in the related work Section, our work improves upon the following classical works (and its follows up work) in one or several metrics: [2] , BGW, Yao, GRR and GMW.
• Addition and XOR can be performed without communication. Evaluation of a fan-in AND gate using w variables can be done in O(log k) rounds using messages of size O(2 w−k ) for an arbitrary parameter k ∈ [2, w] and O(2 w−k ) bit operations. Analogously for a fan-in multiplication gate of integers of l bits we require O(log k) rounds using messages of size O(w · l · 2 w−k ) for an arbitrary parameter k ∈ [2, w] and O((w − 1) · l 2 · 2 w−k ) bit operations.
• Our evaluation shows practical improvements in run-time of 3 to 4 orders of magnitude for encryption and decryption and a factor of more than 20 for addition and multiplication compared to GRR relying on Shamir's secret sharing (and its improvements), while lagging behind computation on non-encrypted data of only a factor 5.
Related Work
An unbounded fan-in AND gate can be simulated [2] in (expected) constant number of rounds for arithmetic gates. They encrypt a number a i held by party
with R i being a matrix of random elements. The product of all terms a i is one element in the matrix being the product of all encryptions. To generate matrices of sufficient rank they generate more than n 2 random matrices. We could also use multiplicative inverses in a group, however we follow a different approach based on term expansions. [2] requires messages that are of size proportional to the size of a constant depth, unbounded fanin circuit for the function to evaluate. Our scheme for computation of a w fan-in gate requires asymptotically also a constant number of rounds but more communication. However, for the three party case, it outperforms [2] for a small number of w. For example, for w = 4 [2] requires at least 6 rounds, whereas we need at most five using k = 3. The total amount of communication of [2] is at least 129 · l in contrast to 60 · l of our scheme.
Sharemind [6] uses three parties and additive secret sharing, ie. for a secret x each party P i obtains a share x i such that x i mod 2 32 = x. To perform a multiplication they compute all 6 shares x i ·x j using [11] . A multiplication can be done in three rounds. It requires 3 rounds and 27 messages each containing a 32-bit value. We require significantly at most 2 rounds and 4 messages. [6] also discusses why Shamir secret sharing fails on the ring of 2 32 (and needs more messages on the ring Z p ). [11] uses also an untrusted third party, which assists in the computation of approximate distances (eg. of strings) using various metrics. In their setting a client wants to know if a value held by the server matches her secret string. A "helper" assists in answering the query. The result of the query should also remain secret to the server.
Genaro-Rabin-Rabin (GRR) [13] simplifies BenOrGoldwasser-Widgeson (BGW) [5] . GRR requires n ≥ 2 · t + 1 ≥ 3 parties tolerating collusion of t parties, BGW can handle collusion of t < n/3 parties. In contrast, we tolerate collusion of up to n − 2 parties. Next, we discuss the semi-honest model with t = 1. GRR uses Shamir's secret sharing to derive a protocol for multiplication. For a performance-based comparison see Tables 1 and 2 . Scaling up to n parties multiplying k bit numbers GRR needs O(n 2 k log n) or O(nk 2 ) bit operations due to [18] , which matches our complexity asymptotically. The multiplication pro-tocol Simple-Mult in GRR takes two secrets α and β shared by two polynomials f α (x) and f β (x) to compute α · β. Party i computes the value f α (i) · f β (i) using a random polynomial. Then each player aggregates the input of other players and reduces the size of the polynomial through interpolation to compute his share of α · β.
The paper by Yao [20] from the late 80ies still forms the underpinning for many works evaluating Boolean circuits. Yao showed how one party A can evaluate a private boolean circuit with private inputs from itself and another party B such that A does not learn anything about the inputs of B and B does not learn anything about the circuit or the input of A. To do so A computes a so called "garbled circuit" which is an encryption of the circuit containing its own input. Afterwards Party B evaluates the encrypted circuit using its input and returns the result. Encryption encompasses encrypting every entry of the truth table of the boolean circuit and uses several algorithmic ideas such as oblivious transfer of keys to do the two party computation. The original scheme [20] allowed for a circuit only to be evaluated once without revealing information about the circuit. A lot of improvements have been made of several aspects of the protocol [12, 14, 4] . Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson (GMW) [15] uses oblivious transfer to compute any Boolean circuit. Values are encrypted such that each party holds parts of the non-encrypted value. The GMW protocol has round complexity linear in the depth of the circuit. Oblivious transfer has been continuously optimized, eg. [1] uses symmetric cryptography. Still, using [1] for an oblivious transfer [15] requires (as an optimistic lower bound) at least the size of the security parameter, which is significantly more than our total communication for an AN D. For circuits in disjunctive normal form with the variables per clause being less than the logarithm of the security parameter, we require less communication and local computation than Yao's scheme (and its improvements).
A significant body of work has focused on optimizing either the computational or communication overhead [8, 10, 9, 16] of secure multi-party computation. [8] computes an arithmetic circuit using O(|C| log |C| log 2 n + poly(n, d, log |C|)) arithmetic operations providing perfect security for an adaptive, active adversary. It uses previous techniques, eg. to share a block of secrets with low amortized costs. [10] evaluates a wide class of boolean circuits using O(log |C|polylog(k)) overhead providing statistical security for adaptive, active adversary, overhead for security parameter k. [9] achieves communication overhead of O(|C|nk + poly(nk)) where n is the number of parties and k ≥ log n is the bitwise length of the field over which the computation is carried out. [16] manages to get communication overhead of O(|C| log k) for a security parameter k.
There is a vast number of secret sharing schemes, eg. for a survey see [3] . Our encryption schemes are known. For instance, [17] encrypts a secret using XOR (⊕). Additive encryption as done in our scheme roughly corresponds to [5] and has been also employed by [7] . But the distinction between encrypted values and keys has not been explicitly made or used to improve on the computation of functions such as multiplication. Furthermore, the associative and distributive properties of our encryption schemes have not been exploited to simplify computations.
Model And Network Architecture
We consider the semi-honest model with n ≥ 3 parties out of which at most n − 2 parties can be dishonest. We assume perfectly secure communication channels between parties. In contrast to traditional work, letting each party hold a secret, we take the view of a client-server setting and our primarily goal is to minimize effort on the client side. The network consists of a client, a key holder (KH) and an encrypted value holder (EVH) and at least one helper. The client communicates with the KH and EVH. Generally, the KH holds keys and the EVH holds encrypted values. A network with four parties is shown in Figure 1 . 
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Encryption
Encryption for Boolean Operations: We use the one-time pad. For a given bit m ∈ {0, 1} we choose a random key K ∈ {0, 1}. The encryption EN C K (m) of bit m ∈ {0, 1} using key K is the XOR (⊕ symbol), ie.
Encryption for Arithmetic Operations: We use the one-time pad in an arithmetic ring. For a given number m ∈ {0, 1} l of l bits we choose a random
We denote inverse elements with superscripts, eg. the inverse of
Whereas the encryption in a ring guarantees unconditional security, we also mention the variant without the modulo that is only statistically secure. If we do not use modulo but just add the key, we have: A NOT operation (denoted by ¬) corresponds to computing an XOR of an expression and the constant one. It can be done by the EVH by computing the 'NOT' of the encrypted value. More mathematically, we have ¬a = a ⊕ 1 and
Additions of two (or more) numbers works analogously to the XOR operation. To deal with negative numbers we must use the two complement, ie. a num-
To compute the additive inverse the KH and EVH can "negate" their values, ie. to compute −a the KH computes (
Multiplication and AND Using Four Parties
To illustrate the main ideas we discuss the AND and multiplication of two numbers using four parties. Later, we refine the algorithms to require only three parties. Multiplication and AND work in an analogous manner. We focus on the AND operation. The key idea is to express the AND of the plaintexts using several parts, each consisting of an encrypted value and a key. Each part can be computed on a separate party, eg. we use (and prove) that
computed by one party. Each helper chooses a key to encrypt its part before sharing the encrypted part with the EVH and the key with the KH. The KH and EVH combine all partial results to obtain the key and encrypted value of a ∧ b. The algorithm to compute the AND of two bits is shown in Figure 1 . As we focus on a client-server setting, we minimize the effort for the client and let the parties do secret sharing among themselves. In traditional multi-party computation this task would be performed by the client as part of Step 3. For example, in Figure 1 Step 4 is part of the secret sharing and could also be performed by the client. Thus, the actual computation of the multiplication consists only of steps 5-9. Using pre-sharing of keys, no keys must be transmitted during the computation. Note that the protocol serves primarily to illustrate ideas. It is non-optimal.
2 Multiplication with additive encryption works completely analogously. Dealing with addition in a ring works also analogously, but is slightly more complex. The algorithm (see Figure 3) avoids that keys grow with each multiplication. This requires one additional round of communication, since any term involving a product must end up at the same party (ie. at the EVH). The restriction on the growth of key size follows the standard convention that the product of two numbers requires the same amount of bits as each number itself.
3 Theorem 1. The AND protocol in Figure 1 is perfectly secure and the result is correct.
Proof. Perfect security is immediate, since we use the one-time pad for encryption and no party receives both an encrypted value and the corresponding key.
To show correctness, ie. that we indeed compute a ∧ b, we must prove that the decryption done by the client yields the correct result. From Figure 1 we see that the final key delivered to the client is Kf = t3 ⊕ K3 ⊕ K4. Thus, it remains to show that for the EVH holds the claimed equation in Step 9:
We prove Equation (1) first. It can be derived using basic laws such as distributiveness and associa-2 For instance, Helpers 1 and 2 could each reduce their messages by transmitting only a single message each in Step 8 being the XOR of the two messages they transmit in Step 8.
3 For instance, typically, multiplying two 64bit numbers yields again a 64bit number. If each number is larger than 32 bits, an overflow is triggered.
tiveness, x ⊕ x = 0 and x ⊕ 0 = x:
Note, by using the definition of the encryption EN CK (m) = m ⊕ K we obtain Equation (1) (2):
= EN Ct3⊕K3⊕K4(a ∧ b) ( Step 9, KH, Figure 1 )
Using Three Parties
It is possible to use only three parties for multiplication and AND. We can eliminate any of the four parties. Let us show how to remove Helper 2. For an AND of two secrets a, b encrypted with K a and Figure  1) . None of the other three parties can compute this expression using both EN C K b (b) and K a since all parties hold at least one of the two K b , EN C Ka (a) and therefore they could reveal a secret. However, the remaining helper (ie. Helper 1) can compute on encrypted values, ie. the EVH can encrypt EN C K b (b) with a randomly chosen K 2 to obtain
In particular, the EVH can double encrypt b and it can share EN C K b ⊕K2 (b) with the KH (as long as it does not obtain K 2 ) and the key K2 with the helper. This allows the KH to compute
We encrypt both values, ie. K a with K6 and K b ⊕ K 2 with K5 and compute using Equation (3):
In this case, we do not need to distribute all four terms to (four) different parties. In our scenario the (remaining) helper holds K b ⊕ K2, K5 and EN CK6(Ka). Thus, it can compute two terms, namely EN CK6(Ka)∧EN CK5(K b ⊕ K2) and K5 ∧ EN CK6(Ka). We can even simplify for the helper:
This idea is realized in the protocol shown in Figure 2 . The message complexity can be reduced by pre-sharing of keys. If, in addition, the client shares keys and secrets with all parties directly (rather than forwarding them using the KV and EVH), the helper receives all its messages in Step 5 directly from the client. Furthermore, the client is also assumed to have computed the second encryption of b, and a second encryption of K b and shared it with KV, ie. EN CK b ⊕K2(b), EN CK5(K b ⊕ K2). In this case only one communication round is necessary for a single multiplication, ie. only the helper must send a message to the EVH. 
⊕ t2 ⊕ t3 (Simplifying and using t3 :
Step 10, Figure 2 ) Figure 2) 
Arbitrary Expressions and Reencryption
So far we have explained how a client can compute a single operation using two values. Here we describe how to handle complex operations, consisting potentially of many interleaved XOR and AND operations and expressions containing several additions and multiplications. We describe how to trade the number of transmitted bits and the number of communication rounds. Boolean circuits (as well as arithmetic expressions) can first be transformed, eg. to maximize the number of XOR operations, which do not require communication.
A term consisting of multiple ANDs or multiplications. More precisely, a0 ∧ a1 ∧ . . . ∧ aw−1 can be evaluated using 2 log w − 1 communication rounds by computing pairs of ANDs in parallel, ie. we compute in parallel yi := a2i ∧ a2i+1 for i ∈ [0, n/2]. Next we compute zi := y2i ∧ y2i+1 in parallel for i ∈ [0, n/4] and so on. Note, that in this scenario one AND requires amortized two communication rounds and five messages rather than one round and two messages (see Section 6.1), even if the keys are pre-shared and the client distributes the shares of the secret directly to the helper. The reason is that EVH and KH must share the keys and encrypted value of partial result with the helper. Note, in some cases two different encryptions of the same value might have to be used, eg. the KH and EVH can create them given a single encryption. To reencrypt a value a encrypted with key Ka. The KH chooses a key K ′ a and transmits
The need for two encryptions arises when evaluating circular structures, such as all three terms a ∧ b, a ∧ c and b ∧ c. The encrypted values and keys cannot be distributed such that the helper gets an encrypted value without getting the corresponding key to decrypt it. To compute a ∧ b, the helper gets the key K b , the encrypted key EN CK6(Ka) and the encrypted value EN CK a (a).
To compute a ∧ c the helper must get Kc and the encrypted value EN CK c (c), since it already received EN CK a (a) and thus it cannot get key Ka. To obtain b ∧ c is not possible, since the helper has already K b and Kc and thus cannot get either EN CK c (c) or EN CK b (b).
Furthermore, optimizations are possible to make the transmission of partial results obsolete though keys must still be transmitted. More precisely, each party can aggregate its result locally using XOR (or addition). Proof. Consider the protocol in Figure 2 . Assume we compute all ai ∧ bi and sequentially combine the result. Denote with subscript i partial results in the computation of ai ∧ bi, eg. with Kfi we denote the key for the encryption of ai ∧ bi, ie. EN C Kf i (ai ∧ bi). We have for the EVH (Step 10):
Thus, the helper can transmit only the aggregate ⊕ i∈[0,v] EN CK7 i (p7i) to the EVH. Since all keys and encrypted values are pre-shared (see Section 6.1 for a detailed description of pre-sharing), the KH can operate entirely locally without receiving any result from the helper or EVH.
Larger Fan-in Multiplication
We can compute a0 ∧ a1 ∧ . . . ∧ aw−1 using two rounds only. We discuss two ways. 4 We can trade the number of required (synchronized) rounds to exchange messages for employing more entities. More precisely, to AND w numbers rather than two numbers requires 2 w parties to maintain the same constant round complexity. This follows from Equation (7) generalizing Equation (1), ie. there are 2 w terms with one term being computed by one entity. The second way uses only three parties. Each term in Equation (7) is an AND of encrypted values and keys. The EVH can compute the AND of all encrypted values locally and the KH can do the same for the keys. Each party encrypts its partial result and then they perform 4 A third way using ideas from [2] is not discussed.
an AND of two partial results to obtain the term. This can be done for all terms in parallel. Proof. We can express the AND using 2 w terms by generalizing Equation (1) . For a term consisting of w variables, each variable i can either be the key Ki of secret ai or the encrypted value EN CK i (ai). Let Sw be all subsets of {0, 1, ..., w − 1}. We have
The last step in Equation (7) is just a definition of ti. In the step before we applied to all ai the same transformation as for a0, ie. adding K0 ⊕ K0 and expanding. We rearranged using the commutative property of ∧. In Equation (7) each term ti consists of ANDed values. It can be partitioned into two parts, one consisting of encrypted values tE and one of keys tK, eg. for t = EN CK 0 (a0) ∧ EN CK 1 (a1) ∧ K2 we get tE = EN CK 0 (a0) ∧ EN CK 1 (a1) and tK = K2. The EVH can compute the term tE by computing the AND of all encrypted values without communication and the KH the term tK in the same manner. The EVH encrypts the locally computed term tE and the KH encrypts tK, ie. the EVH chooses key KtE, computes EN CK tE (tE) and sends the key KtE to KH. The KH chooses KtK, computes EN CK tK (tK) and sends the encrypted value EN CK tK (tK ) to the EVH. Then they run the protocol (Figure 2 ) to AND the two terms tE ∧ tK . They compute
ti can be computed using a constant number of rounds and messages of constant size.
Beyond Three Parties
For n > 3 parties we can ensure confidentiality given at most n − 2 parties collude. Using more parties comes at a small price on the client side: The client must perform more operations (proportional to the number of parties that should not collude). The client encrypts each value m with k − 1 keys, ie. EN CK0⊕K1⊕...⊕K k−2 (m). We use k − 1 KHs, such that KH i holds key Ki. As in the three party case, XOR is performed by the EVH and the k − 1 KHs by simply XORing their values. To AND two values we do an analogous derivation as for Equation (1):
Expanding the last term yields k 2 terms in contrast to 4 terms in Equation (1) . One way is to compute each term by a separate party. This requires n = k 2 parties in order to maintain confidentiality of data for collusion of up to k − 1 parties. However, in fact we need only one helper which interacts with all KHs and the EVH. Thus, we use k = n − 2 KHs, one EVH and one helper. Assume party P0 is the EVH and Pi is the i th KH. We want to compute a term xi ∧ yj with xi ∈ Va with Va := {EN CK a,0 ⊕K a,1 ⊕...⊕K a,k−2 (a), Ka,0, Ka,1, ..., K a,k−2 } and yj
The party having xi and the party having yj can compute the AND using the helper and one party taking the role of the EVH and one of the KH. They treat xi and yj as secret, ie. they encrypt xi and yj to get EN CKx i (xi) and EN CKy j (yj) and run the protocol in Figure 2 . Thus, for each of the k out of the k 2 terms for which a party holds a value (key or encrypted value) vi ∈ (Va ∪ V b ), it either obtains a key Kij or an encrypted value EN CK ij (xi ∧ xj). A party can XOR all its k partial results for a value vi to obtain its contribution for vi ∧ yj (assuming vi ∈ V b ; vi ∈ Va is analogous). The helper does not learn anything about xi, yj and since for each of the k 2 terms we choose different keys, the helper can also not combine values (encryptions or keys) obtained from different parties to reveal a secret. Corollary 1. Using n parties up to n − 2 parties can collude while maintaining data confidentiality.
Empirical Evaluation
Our intention was to evaluate the overhead for encryptions, decryptions, additions and multiplications of 32bit unsigned integers compared to GRR in terms of computation and communication. We implemented GRR relying on Shamir's Secret Sharing [19] in C++ using the NTL lib. 5 We ran our experiments on an Intel Core i5. For GRR we used a 33 bit prime.
To assess computational performance we computed the average time per operation per party in microseconds using 10 million operations, denoted by '[ys/op/party]' in Table 1 . Whereas for GRR all parties perform the same computations, in our scheme there are differences. We used the slowest party to make the comparison fair.
The amount of communication to perform an addition or multiplication is given in Table 2 . Since for GRR secrets are hosted at the parties, to compare our protocol ( Figure 3 ) we also assumed that keys and secrets are held at the parties, ie. they do not have to be distributed by the client. Table 2 is based on pre-shared keys between each pair of parties, eg. by exchanging a single key and then using this key as input for a pseudo random number generator. Thus, we only need to transmit EN CK8(t0 + q0), EN CK3(t2 + q1 + K8 −1 ) (requiring 64 bits each) and EN C Kf (a · b) (requiring 32 bits) and we only need two rounds. For GRR each party sends two messages with 33 bits each.
Conclusions
We have presented a new methodology for secure-multi party computation. It strikes through little computational overhead, being unconditionally secure, not relying on a particular assumption (such as the hardness of one-way functions), being able to handle far more than a dishonest majority, conceptual simplicity and being flexible, ie. allowing to achieve either asymptotically optimal round complexity or communication complexity. 
